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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court erred in denying post-conviction relief. Nothing
in the State's argument alters that conclusion. ·
Mr. Padilla set out in his Opening Brief why the District Court erred in
denying post-conviction relief. Specifically, the District Court erred in its
conclusion that a motion to suppress would not have been granted in this case and
thus counsel was not ineffective in failing to file one.
In particular, the District Court concluded:
The officers in this case had no knowledge of any specific criminal
activity in the area, such as car burglaries or thefts. Gonzales only
observed that Padilla fled upon his approach. Thus the issue here is
whether that flight would justify an investigatory stop.
R58.
The District Court went on to conclude that unprovoked flight at night in a
residential neighborhood is clearly indicative of criminal wrongdoing. While noting
that the key factor for the Wardlow 1 analysis is that the flight occurs upon noticing
the police, the Court held based upon Mr. Padilla's later testimony that he was
aware of a misdemeanor warrant and did not want to be picked up, that the flight
in this case was caused by his awareness of the police and not coincidental. Thus, a
motion to suppress would not have been successful. R 58-60.
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Padilla argued that this conclusion of law, subject
to free review, Padilla v. State, 158 Idaho 184, 186, 345 P.3d 243, 245 (Ct. App.

1

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000).
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14), was erroneous. He argued that as set out in State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636,
2002), as cited and quoted with approval in Padilla, 158 Idaho at 189-90,
345 P.3d at 248-249, "the key is that the relationship between the police and the
suspect flight was causal rather than coincidental." Per Kreps, that determination
depends upon whether there is evidence permitting a reasonable inference that (1)
the suspect knew the police were present and (2) the police believed the suspect was
aware of the police presence. 650 N.W.2d at 644. Mr. Padilla further noted that a
suspect's actions and statements after the seizure "plainly cannot serve as one of
the circumstantial facts from which the presence of reasonable suspicion is to be
determined." Id., quoting United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1980).
Mr. Padilla argued that there was not evidence to demonstrate that his flight
was causal rather than coincidental since there was not evidence that he was aware
of the police presence. He further argued that the District Court had actually
expanded Wardlow in holding that the flight without anything else was sufficient to
allow the seizure. He argued that this violated both the United States and Idaho
Constitutions, setting out an independent state constitutional analysis of Article I, §

17.
He lastly argued that the District Court's further conclusion that the card,
spark plug pieces and flashlight would have been nonetheless admissible because
they were abandoned was incorrect because the tossing of those items occurred after
he had submitted to the police and not before. And, further he argued that the
District Court was incorrect in concluding that these items provided probable cause
2

arrest and search subsequent to arrest.
response, the State has argued that contrary to the District Court's
statement, the stop was supported not only by Mr. Padilla's flight but also by his
fumbling and shuffling in an alley at 2:00 am. This the State argues provided
reasonable articulable suspicion.
The State further argues that based upon Mr. Padilla's testimony after the
fact that he had a misdemeanor warrant and did not want to get picked up that the
flight was caused by the police presence and not coincidental.
The State does not respond to the argument that the District Court had
expanded Wardlow in holding that flight alone could justify a stop in this case.
Further, the State does not respond to the argument that even if the stop would
have been allowed under the federal constitution, it is not allowed under the Idaho
constitution.
Lastly, the State argues that Mr. Padilla had not submitted to the police
when he lay in the bushes and that therefore the items he discarded were
abandoned and not subject to suppression. The State further concludes that there
is no evidence that the items were discarded as a result of police misconduct
because the stop was legal.
The State's argument that the seizure was supported not only by flight but by
Mr. Padilla's presence in the alleyway is contrary to the District Court's conclusions
and to the law. The District Court specifically stated that the reasonable suspicion
in this case came only from flight: "Gonzales only observed that Padilla fled upon
3

Thus the issue here is whether that flight would justify an
investigatory stop." R 58. As the Court noted, there were no reports of burglaries
or other crimes in the neighborhood. Id. Further, people live in neighborhoods and
are free to enter and exit at all hours. See LaFave 104 Search & Seizure §
9.5(e)(5th ed.). Indeed, even presence in a high crime area without more is not
enough to support a Terry 2 stop. State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 435, 146 P.3d 697,
701 (Ct. App. 2006). Mr. Padilla's presence in the neighborhood, which was in fact
his own neighborhood, did not support the finding of reasonable suspicion.
Likewise, the State's argument that Mr. Padilla's flight could be found to
have been caused by the police presence and not coincidental to that presence is
contrary to law. The legality of a stop depends upon the knowledge of the officer at
the time of the stop. United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1980),
discussed in Padilla u. State, 158 Idaho at 190, 345 P.3d at 249. Statements made
after the fact are not relevant because what it controls is what the officer knows at
the time of the stop, not what he learns after the stop. Id.
In this case, according to the District Court's findings of fact, Officer
Gonzales sped towards Mr. Padilla with all his lights off in a way that startled Mr.
Padilla. The officer turned the car so that Mr. Padilla "could see" it. However,
there was no factual finding that Mr. Padilla did see the car and recognized it as a
police cruiser. Nor was there a factual finding that Officer Gonzales believed that

2

Terry u. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968).
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. Padilla recognized his car as a police car or him as a police officer. Rather, the
Court found that Mr. Padilla believed he was about to be jumped. Further,
although the District Court found that Officer Gonzales yelled at Mr. Padilla to
stop, it also found that Mr. Padilla did not hear the officer's yells. R 130-131.
The relevant circumstances are what was known at the time of the stop and
according to the District Court's factual findings, Officer Gonzales did not know
that Mr. Padilla recognized the police car as a police car. Nor did the officer know
that Mr. Padilla recognized him as an officer. Moreover, the Court did find that Mr.
Padilla did not hear the officer's yelling. At the time of the stop, Officer Gonzales
did not have a basis to conclude that Mr. Padilla's flight was caused by his presence
as a police officer. Thus, the stop based only upon this flight was not constitutional.

Wardlow, supra; Kreps, supra. What Mr. Padilla may have testified to later is not
relevant to the analysis of the stop. Jones, supra.

It is also of note that the State has not disputed that the state constitution is
more protective of the right to privacy than the federal constitution. Nor has the
State disputed that even if the stop of Mr. Padilla was allowed under the federal
constitution, it is not permissible under the state constitution. See, Padilla v. State,
158 Idaho at 188, 345 P.3d at 247, ftnt. 3 declining to address an argument made by
the State for the first time at oral argument. See also, State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013), and State v. Smith,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ ,
2016 WL 455979 (Ct. App. 2016), holding that when the State does not argue an
error was harmless, it cannot be said to have met its burden of proving the error
5

beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the State's failure to argue to the
Mr. Padilla asks this Court to conclude that regardless of federal
constitutional analysis the stop in this case violated the state constitution.
Mr. Padilla also asks this Court to reject the State's argument that the items
discarded by Mr. Padilla were discarded before he submitted to police authority.
These items were discarded after Mr. Padilla gave up running. At that point he had
submitted to police authority. And, given that the police stop violated the state and
federal constitutions, the items he discarded were subject to suppression.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Padilla asks
this Court to hold that the District Court erred in denying the petition for postconviction relief. He asks that the District Court's order be reversed and relief be
granted.
Respectfully submitted this ///:Aday of February, 2016.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Tarango Padilla
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